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Abstract
This paper presents estimates of union wage differentials and explores
to what extent they are affected by the degree of unionisation. For this
purpose, data at the individual level obtained from the British Household
Panel Survey (BHPS) are used. Our results support the hypothesis that
the union wage premium is mainly a recognition premium. For the period
1995-1997 our estimate of the recognition premium is about 4%. This
result takes into account unobserved worker heterogeneity and is obtained
by using a more efficient panel data estimator compared to earlier studies.
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1 Introduction
This paper presents estimates of the membership premium and the recognition
premium for Great Britain using panel data on an individual level. We define the
membership premium as the wage premium that members receive in comparison
with non-members within a workplace where a wage agreement is present. The
wage premium of workers in a workplace with a wage agreement compared to
workers in a workplace without such an agreement is referred to as the recogni-
tion premium.1 So far, few papers exist for Great Britain that adopt both an
individual panel data approach and distinguish between union membership and
union recognition (Swaffield (1999) and Hildreth (1999),(2000)).2
Swaffield (1999) and Hildreth (1999) present significant evidence for the ex-
istence of a recognition premium for female workers, but not for male workers.
Hildreth (2000) did not find a significant robust estimate for the recognition
premium using a sample of both male and female workers.3 These results are
somewhat puzzling given that in Great Britain the decision to recognise a union
is taken by the employer on a voluntary basis. Therefore, there is no a priori
reason to expect differences between male and female workers for the recognition
premium. Moreover, it is hard to believe that there does not exist a recogni-
tion premium in Great Britain given cross-sectional evidence as in Blanchflower
(1991), Blackaby, Murphy and Sloane (1991), Blackaby, Murphy and O´Leary
(1999), Swaffield (1999) and Hildreth ((1999),(2000)). In addition, Millward,
Bryson and Forth (2000) present survey evidence on the establishment level
from the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS) that indicates that in
1It is important to identify which workers can benefit from a wage agreement in a workplace.
For the US in so-called Right-to-Work states unions that negotiate with employers are required
by law to act on behalf of all workers. Workers on their part are free in their decision to
become a union member or not. In contrast, employers in Great Britain recognise unions for
the purpose of bargaining on a voluntary basis. Even if a majority of the workers is in favor
of recognition, the employer is not obliged to recognise a union. Similarly, workers are free in
their decision to join a union.
2Early papers that distinguish between the two types of union status and use cross-sectional
analysis techniques are: Green (1988), Blanchflower (1991) and Blackaby, Murphy and Sloane
(1991). Recent papers are Andrews, Stewart, Swaffield and Upward (1998), Blackaby, Murphy
and O’Leary (1999).
3All studies do take into account the presence of a potential unobserved individual effect
correlated with union status.
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1998 on average 69% of the employees working in a workplace with a recognised
union were covered by collective bargaining. They further found a union mem-
bership density in such workplaces of 56%. These figures are even higher for
1990 (81% and 68% respectively).4
The strongest indication for the existence of a recognition premium is pro-
vided by Booth and Bryan (2001). Using a employer-employee sample of work-
places covered by a wage agreement, they do not find significant differences in
wages between members and non-members of a union.
It seems curious that, so far, the results for the recognition premium are so
diverse. However, assuming existence of a recognition premium, the presence of
spill-overs between unionised and non-unionised establishments might explain
why it is difficult to identify it in empirical work. For example, if in determining
wages, non-unionised firms follow unionised firms we do not observe systematic
wage differences between workers in unionised and non-unionised environments,
and, as a result, there is no recognition premium.
Economic theory offers different explanations for the impact of union wage
bargaining on non-union wages. First, threat effects of unionisation might in-
duce non-union employers to increase the non-union wage to avoid unionisa-
tion of their workers (see Rosen (1969), Pencavel (1991), Freeman and Medoff
(1983)). Second, an increase in the union wage might lead union workers to
move into the non-union sector because they prefer non-union jobs above un-
employment. The increased supply of workers in the non-union sector leads to
a decrease in the non-union wage (Johnson and Mieszkowski (1970)). Third,
a union wage increase might lead to increased substitution towards non-union
products by consumers. As a consequence, non-union labour demand increases
which leads to a higher non-union wage if labour supply of non-union work-
ers is imperfectly elastic (Hirsch and Addison (1986), p119). Fourth, Freeman
and Medoff (1981) argue that trade unions are active in environments with low
labour demand elasticities. In such conditions, a trade union can press harder
4For 1998 only 2% of the workplaces have a closed shop arrangement and in 21% of the
workplaces employees received a strong recommendation for union membership. Figures for
1990 are 8% and 34% respectively.
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for a wage increase, as there is a lower risk of employment loss.5
This paper provides evidence for the hypothesis that the wage premium
union members earn in comparison to nonunion workers is mainly a recognition
premium instead of a membership premium. The data used for the analysis are
from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). Our result is obtained by
using a more efficient panel data estimator than in previous studies. We also
estimated union wage premia that take into account the impact of unionisation.
These estimates support our main result.
In what follows the next section outlines the empirical model. Section three
describes the data. The fourth section presents and interprets the estimates of
the membership premium and the recognition premium. Section five presents
estimates of the effect of unionisation on both premia and a discussion. Section
six concludes.
2 Empirical Model
In this section we present the empirical model we use to explain wages of union
and non-union workers. The British system of industrial relations is such that
four types of union status can be assigned to workers. In Great Britain, workers
can be a member or a non-member of a union, while their employer is free to
decide on recognising a union for the purpose of bargaining. Hence, we can
divide the British workforce in four groups. First, we have workers who are a
member of a union that is recognised by the employer. Second, we have workers
who are not a member of a union that is recognised by their employer. Third,
there are workers who are a member of a union but their employer did not
recognise a union. Last, there are workers who are not a member of a union and
whose employer did not recognise a union. Instead of a priori assuming that all
5The trade union reduces substitution possibilities of the employer with respect to input
factors other than union labour. Marshall’s derived demand rules then imply a lower union
labour demand elasticity. For the same reason, unions have a higher probability of survival
in environments with a low labour demand elasticity. Freeman and Medoff (1981) provide
empirical support by presenting evidence of a positive correlation between the percentage of
union organisation and union wage premia. The percentage of union organisation is a proxy
for substitution, since a high percentage of unionised workers in a sector reduces substitution
possibilities for employers.
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workers in workplaces without a recognised union earn the same wage, we allow
for the possibility that members and non-members within such workplaces can
earn different wages.6 As a consequence, a worker in Great Britain is assumed
to earn one of the four following types of wages depending upon the category a
worker locates himself into:
wru,it = α
r
u + β
r
uxit + v
r
u,it (1)
wrn,it = α
r
n + β
r
nxit + v
r
n,it (2)
wnru,it = α
nr
u + β
nr
u xit + v
nr
u,it (3)
wnrn,it = α
nr
n + β
nr
n xit + v
nr
n,it (4)
Here, subscript idenotes workers while subscript t denotes periods. Further, u
denotes union members, n denotes non-membership, r denotes recognition of
a union present in the workplace and nr refers to the absence of a recognised
union in the workplace of worker i. For each type of worker, the wage equals
the sum of an intercept αsm and a linear function of individual characteristics
xit with corresponding coefficients βsm and a mean zero random error term v
s
m,it
(s ∈ {r, nr}, m ∈ {u, n}). Equation (1) describes the wage a worker earns if
he has a job in a workplace with a recognised union and is a union member.
Equation (2) describes the wage a worker earns if he has a job in a workplace
with a recognised union but is not a member. Similarly, equation (3) is the
wage a worker earns if he has a job in a workplace without a recognised union
and is a member of a union. Finally, equation (4) refers to a worker who has a
job in a workplace where no union is recognised, and who is not a member of a
union.
If we use an indicator rit to denote recognition (1) or not (0) and, similarly
defined, the membership indicator uit, the observed wage is given by:
wit = γ0 + γ1rituit + γ2rit(1− uit) + γ3uit(1− rit) + βxit + vit (5)
6The third category of workers is typically small compared to the other categories. This
is the reason why in empirical work the latter two categories are usually combined into one
category of workers.
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where γ0 = αnrn , γ1 = (α
r
u − αnrn ), γ2 = (αrn − αnrn ) and γ3 = (αrn − αnru ). The
effect of individual characteristics upon a person’s wage is assumed to be equal
to β for all four types of wages. Unless we are willing to assume that union
status is determined exogenously, vit generally has a conditional mean that is
unequal to zero.7 As such, OLS estimates based on (5) will be inconsistent.
To obtain consistent estimates we will use an instrumental variable approach.
We assume that the endogeneity of union status enters the wage equation in a
time-invariant way by assuming that the conditional mean of vit given z∗i is
constant over time and different for each worker. Here, z∗i is a subset of all
regressors in all time periods. We denote this conditional mean by ηi. Given
this assumption, our first model is given by the following equation:8
wit = γ0 + γ1rituit + γ2rit(1− uit) + γ3uit(1− rit) + βxit + ηi + ζit, (6)
where ηi equals E(vit|z∗i ) and is orthogonal to the error term ζit. Note that all
regressors which are not included in z∗i are valid (internal) instruments. This is
in contrast to the within-group estimator which assumes that all regressors in
each period are potentially correlated with the unobserved fixed effect ηi.
3 Data
The data used for our analysis are obtained from the British Household Panel
Survey. Only information is used from those waves that contain information
on union status for all individuals. Our sample covers the period 1995-1997
and is unbalanced over time. The reason for including only for these years
observations is that for 1992-1994 information on union status is only available
for individuals who changed jobs.9 In addition, rather than using a sample of
7Note that:
vit = v
nr
n,it + rituit(v
r
u,it-v
nr
n,it) + rit(1− uit)
(vrn,it-v
nr
n,it) + (1− rit)uit(vnru,it-vnrn,it)
8See Robinson (1989) for a discussion on fixed effect specifications in the context of union
wages.
9For these years there is information on membership available for all workers in the Values
and Opinions Section of the BHPS. However, this section does not provide information on
union recognition.
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manual male workers or females, our sample includes all workers. We think
this is important for estimation of the recognition premium as the employer
decides on recognition of a union. Unless the criterion that selects the subsample
is independent of employer behaviour, the recognition premium needs to be
interpreted conditional on the choice of the subsample. Since it is not clear
what group of employers will be selected if only male or female workers are
included, we prefer to work with both types of gender in our sample.
In our sample we observe 775 workers for two consecutive periods, while 1580
workers are observed for each of the three years.10 Table 1 shows the distribution
of workers over the four union categories. Over the whole period 37.6% of the
workers in the sample are member of a recognised union. A proportion of 17.6%
of the workers is working in a workplace with a recognised union, but did not
join the union as a member. The largest proportion (43.6%) of workers works
in a workplace without a recognised union and is not a member of a union. The
smallest proportion (2.0%) of workers consists of members of a union that is
not recognised in their workplace. The differences between the three years are
small. The distribution of workers over union categories is very much in line
with that of Blackaby et al. (1999) who present similar figures for the period
1993-1995 using data from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey.
Our dependent variable is log gross hourly wages in 1995 consumer prices.11
A preliminary analysis of the wage differentials compares average wages between
the different union categories. Table 2 shows the unconditional wage differentials
of workers compared to non-members in a workplace without a recognised union.
Table 2 shows that the unconditional membership premium in our sample is
22.9%, while the unconditional recognition premium equals 9.1%.12 Members
10This sample is drawn from a larger sample of which the criterion was no missing values on
any of the variables included in the regression or the dependent variable. This larger sample
contains 7819 individual-year observations.
11This includes paid overtime which implies paid overtime hours are included to construct
the hourly wage. The CPI-index for the UK is used as a deflator and obtained from the
OECD.
12The percentage difference in wages with respect to the reference group is 25.9% and is
calculated as exp(0.229)-1. For expositional purposes, we will interpret the differences in
logarithmic wages as percentage differences.
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of a union that is not recognised in their workplace, however, have the largest
unconditional wage differential. Note that this group is very small and shows,
for example, that the difference is not significant for 1995. Andrews et al. (1998)
suggest to assume that membership does not have an effect on the wage of an
individual who works in a workplace without a recognised union. Blackaby et
al. (1999) reject this assumption and choose to omit these individuals from
the sample as they might be subject to misclassification. We prefer to include
members of a trade union that is not recognised in our sample, and to treat
them as a separate group. Table 3 shows that these individuals are located in
better jobs in comparison to workers in the other union categories. This could
explain the high mean wage of this group.
In all regressions, control variables are included to reduce omitted variable
bias in the coefficients of interest. These are: industrial sector (10), job occu-
pation (9), region (18), full-time, female, married, health, head of household,
age, holder of qualification, firm size (4), manual worker, public sector , had
training last year, job tenure and job tenure squared, time-dummies, and age
at the time of completing education. Summary statistics of the regressors are
given in Table 4. As our main interest is in union wage differentials we will
focus on the coefficients of the union variables in the presentation.
4 Union Premia Estimates
In this section, we present our union premia estimates based on equation (6).
The results are shown in Table 5. Three different estimators are used. The first
column in Table 5 shows the pooled OLS results. They indicate that workers
who are a member of a recognised union earn about 12% more than non-union
workers. For non-members in a workplace with a recognised union an estimated
wage difference of 3.5% with non-union workers is obtained, although it is not
very precise. For members of a union that is not recognised, no significant es-
timate is obtained. These results suggest that more than half of the obtained
unconditional wage differential for members can be explained by the control
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variables. The same applies to the non-members in a workplace with a recog-
nised union present. Our pooled OLS estimate for recognised members is close
to the 10.5% obtained by Hildreth (2000) for male manual workers. Blackaby
et al. (1999) report comparable estimates of 10.0% and 10.4% for manual male
workers and female workers, respectively. Regarding recognised non-members,
Hildreth (2000) obtains a pooled OLS estimate of 3.6%, while Blackaby et al.
(1999) obtain estimates of 4.0% and 7.4% for manual male respectively manual
female workers. Our pooled OLS estimates indicate a membership premium of
8.7%, which is in line with the average estimated union wage gap from cross-
section models of 8% for Great Britain (see Booth (1995), p180).
In order to account for potential unobserved time-invariant individual het-
erogeneity the within group estimator is employed. Essentially, it assumes that
the union status variables and all control variables are potentially correlated in
a time-invariant way with the unobserved individual effect. The results for this
estimator are given in the second column of Table 5. In comparison with the
pooled OLS estimates the estimated coefficients are much smaller. For none of
the three union status variables a significant estimate is obtained. Apparently,
the variation over time of our main variables of interest is not sufficient to ob-
tain precise within-group-estimates of union wage premia. We therefore follow
Arellano and Bover (1995) and turn to a more efficient system estimator which
is in the spirit of Hausman and Taylor (1981). This estimator uses internal in-
struments that are assumed to be uncorrelated with the unobserved individual
effect. It is called system estimator as we estimate a system of equations that
consists of two parts. Our first part consists of two first-differenced equations
since we have three periods of observations are available. Our second part con-
sists of a level equation in time-means of our original equation of interest. The
advantage of this approach as compared to the within group estimator, is that it
exploits additional information contained in the level equation. Therefore, more
efficient estimates are obtained than on the basis of the within group estimator.
For our system of differenced equations, all variables can be used as instruments
as the unobserved individual effect is eliminated. For our level equation, time-
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means of variables not correlated with the individual effect can serve as internal
instruments for the endogenous variables.
For the system-estimates presented in Table 5 female, head of household,
age, married, health, sectoral dummies, tenure and tenure squared, and the
regional dummies are used as instruments for the level equation. The time-
means of these instrumental variables are used as internal instruments for the
level equation. For the system of differenced equations, all exogenous variables
of each period could potentially be used as instruments. To allow for possible
feedback of unobserved components of the differenced equation on future values
of included regressors, we treat all regressors as predetermined. In order to test
for the specification of the model, two tests have been conducted. These are a
Sargan-over-identifying restrictions test for the validity of all instruments, and a
test for correlation between the unobserved effect and instruments used for the
level equation.13 We arrived at the specification in Table 5 after testing several
sets of instruments.
Column (3) in Table 5 shows that union members earn 4.2% more than
non-union workers. This is about one third of the estimate obtained by the
pooled OLS and more than twice the estimate of the within group estimator.
The estimate obtained for non-members is similar to that of the pooled OLS
estimator. Their wages are estimated 3.3% higher than non-union workers. The
membership wage premium is equal to the difference between the coefficients
of union members and non-union members. The resulting estimate is 0.9%
with a standard error of 1.7%. It suggests that no significant wage difference
exists between members and non-members in a workplace with a recognised
union.14 The coefficient for non-members suggests a recognition premium of
3.3%. As such our system estimate of the membership premium is smaller than
the recognition wage premium. This suggests that not only union members in
13See Arellano (1993) for testing mean independence between individual unobserved effects
and a set of instruments.
14While these estimates are not very precise (significant at a level of 10%) one notes that
more precise estimates of the coefficients are obtained in comparison to the within-group
estimator.
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workplaces with a recognised union benefit from wage provisions. Apparently, it
cannot be excluded that non-members in some workplaces benefit as well from
union wage bargains. To further explore this issue, we estimate a model with
recognition and non-recognised members included as union variables. We would
expect a coefficient between 0.033 and 0.042 for the recognition dummy. Column
four of Table 5 shows that this is indeed the case. The estimated coefficient of
recognition equals 0.041. Moreover, it is more precise (significant at a level of
5%) than the coefficients of recognised members and recognised non-members in
column three. Hence, our estimates suggest that there is a recognition premium
of about 4% while the membership premium is very small.
In contrast with our finding of wage premium of 4.2% for members of a
recognised union in comparison to workers in a workplace where no union was
recognised, Hildreth (2000) reports an unrealistically high wage premium of
36.1%. No robust estimate was obtained by him for non-members. The sample
used by Hildreth (2000) covered the period 1991-1994 and comprised full-time
workers in the private sector. In his analysis he corrected for measurement
error, since for the second, third and fourth wave, union status variables are only
available for individuals who recently changed job. His approach is different from
ours in that he used external instruments for first-differenced wage equations.15
The high estimate for recognised members suggests that the chosen instrument
set does not correct completely for the endogeneity of union status.
So far, mixed results have been found for the wage differential of non-
members in a recognised workplace relative to non-members in a workplace
where no union is recognised. In the next section, we analyse the extent to
which the recognition premium earned by non-members in a workplace with
a recognised union, is affected by the degree of unionisation across jobs and
sectors.
15For union members he used lagged increase-in-union-dues-indicators while lagged
employer-pension-scheme-provision-indicators were used as instruments for nonmembers.
The indicators indicate an increase in mean union dues where means are taken over
age/regional/socio-economic groups. They are constructed using data from the Family Ex-
penditure Survey (FES).
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5 Impact of Unionisation
In this section, we will explore the impact of unionisation on union wage pre-
mia. Equation (6) is restrictive in assuming that for two comparable groups
of workers, the benefits from membership of a recognised trade union are the
same, irrespective of the fractions of union members within the two groups. For
example, if worker A and worker B have the same profession and work in the
same industrial sector, their working environments can still be very different
in terms of unionisation. Therefore, a more natural specification seems one in
which gains of union status are a function of the degree of unionisation. We de-
note by Oit the degree of unionisation in the sector where worker i is employed
in period t. Hence, we propose a specification in which the estimated coefficients
on union status depend on unionisation Oit. In particular, we assume:
γj,it = fj(Oit, δ) j = 0, 1, 2, 3, (7)
where fj is some parametric function that describes the relation between the
relative gain of union status j and the degree of unionisation Oit. Note that
now the gains of union status are time-varying and individual specific in that it
matters in which environment an individual works. One could choose a linear
specification for fj which is still restrictive, since it assumes that the marginal
return of the degree of unionisation is independent of the level of unionisation.
Intuitively, a minimum amount of members is needed for a union to be effec-
tive.16 We employ a more flexible piece-wise approach based on the empirical
distribution of unionisation Oit. We denote by oit the rank order of the sector
in which worker i works in period t in terms of unionisation. We model the rank
order as the empirical cumulative distribution function Ft of unionisation Oit
in period t, that is
oit = Ft(Oit). (8)
16Indeed this is one of the basic assumptions made in models of endogenous membership.
See Booth (1995) for a discussion and references with respect to this literature.
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Next, we construct indicator functions to distinguish between low and high
unionized environments. This allows us to compare union wage differentials
between low unionized environments with high unionized environments. The
indicator dq,it denotes whether the environment in which worker i works in
period t belongs to the qth order class or not. If I(.) denotes the indicator
function, dq,it is given by:
d1,it = I(oit ≤ 1
Q
)
dq,it = I(
q − 1
Q
< oit ≤ q
Q
) q = 2, ..., Q− 1
dQ,it = I(
Q− 1
Q
< oit) (9)
Essentially, (9) breaks the empirical cumulative distribution function of union-
isation into Q quantiles. With (9), our second model follows and is given by:17
wit = µ+
(
Q∑
q=2
δ0qdq,it
)
+
(
Q∑
q=1
δ1qdq,it
)
rituit +(
Q∑
q=1
δ2qdq,it
)
rit(1− uit) +
(
Q∑
q=1
δ3qdq,it
)
uit(1− rit)
+βxit + κi + λit (10)
In (10), µ = δ01 such that the reference group consists of workers who are not
members of a union and work in workplaces without a recognised union present.
In addition, the sector they work in belongs to the lowest quantile in terms of
the degree of unionisation.
For our estimations, we use three different measures of unionisation which
are defined with respect to occupation-industry cells. The first measure O1
17Equation (10) follows in a similar way as equation (5). Here κi = E(ξit|z∗i ), λit is
orthogonal to κi and ξit is given by:
ξit = vit + rituite1,it + rit(1− uit)e2,it
uit(1− rit)e3,it + (1− uit)(1− rit)e0,it
Note that the time-varying coefficients of union status depend on unionization through the
empirical cumulative distribution function:
γj,it =
Q∑
q=1
δjqdq,it, j = 0, 1, 2, 3
13
is defined as the number of members divided by the total number of work-
ers. Comparable to Freeman and Medoff (1981), we attach to this measure the
interpretation that for an employer an increase in O1 reduces possibilities of
substitution of other workers for union members. These other workers can be
non-members or non-union workers. The second measure, O2, is defined as the
number of members divided by the total number of workers in workplaces where
a union is recognised. Here, an increase in O2 can be associated with a decrease
in substitution possibilities of non-members for members for an employer who
recognised a union. The third measure, O3, is the number of workers in work-
places where a union is recognised divided by total number of workers. An
increase in O3 implies reduced substitution possibilities of members and non-
members for non-union workers.18 The three measures are related with each
other, in that O1 equals the product of O2 and O3. Measure O3 can be thought
of as the between workplace component of unionisation and O2 as the within
component of unionisation. It should be stressed that all three measures are
defined with respect to occupation-industry cells for each year of the period
1995-1997. The descriptive statistics for each measure are given in Tables 6 and
7. One can infer from Table 6 that the distribution of each measure is fairly
stable over time. Table 7 shows, perhaps surprisingly, that the distribution of
union categories across workers is quite similar for the three different measures.
A priori, our measures of unionisation can be expected to represent a certain
degree of bargaining power of the union. The reason is that, for our sample pe-
riod (1995-1997), unions could restrict membership to workers only on the basis
of profession, industrial sector and region.19 As two out of three restrictions on
18For measures one and three division is by total workers in a cell less the number of
members of a union that is not recognized. The reason is that this group of members seems
to be a selective group of workers hence we chose to account for that in our measures of union
organization.
19As stated by the Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act 1993 (c. 19) (section
on right to membership of trade union):
A requirement in relation to membership of a union is ¨enforceable [...] if it restricts
membership solely by reference to one or more of the following criteria-
(a) employment in a specified trade, industry or profession,
(b) occupational description (including grade, level or category of appointment), and
(c) possession of specified trade, industrial or professional qualifications or work experience.
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membership define the cells we constructed, our measures can be associated with
bargaining power.20 Our intention is to analyse whether the estimated wage dif-
ferential for non-members in workplaces with a recognised union is an average
effect of workplaces with different degrees of unionisation. For our regressions,
we use three quantile indicators.
Table 8 shows the system estimates for our second model given in (10).
We did not interact non-recognised members with unionisation as it concerns
a very small group of individuals. The table reads as follows. Low refers to a
lowly unionised environment while high refers to a highly unionised environment.
Medium refers to an environment with an intermediate degree of unionisation.
All union coefficients represent effects relative to non-members who work in
an environment of low degree of union organisation and without a recognised
union present. For example, the coefficient high (δ13) for members of a recog-
nised union indicates the expected wage differential between a worker with this
union status in a highly unionised environment an a comparable non-members
in a low union organisation environment without a recognised union present.
The difference δ23 − δ03 is the recognition wage premium in a highly unionised
environment, while the difference δ13− δ23 is the membership wage premium in
a highly unionised environment.
Table 9 presents the estimated membership and recognition premia that fol-
low from 8. For the first measure, we obtain a significant recognition premium
of 5.3% and a negative membership premium of -4.3% (significant at 10%) in
a low unionisation environment. These results suggest that in low unionisa-
tion environments, non-members earn a wage premium of 5.3% with respect to
non-union workers. Members in low unionisation environments earn 4.3% less
than non-members in workplaces with a recognised union. These results are
20Ideally all three components are used for constructing our measure. The reason for not
including region is to avoid measurement error which is more likely at a higher level of dis-
aggregation. In our data we have nine categories for profession, ten for industrial sectors and
nineteen for regions. Hence 1710 different cells could be constructed. For the construction of
our measure 10162 observations are used over three periods. Assuming an equal distribution
of cells over workers and years this would leave on average (10162/3)/1710=2 workers per cell
to construct our measure for. With our current stratification we have on average 38 workers
per cell.
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intuitive as we would expect that non-members in workplaces with a recognised
union cannot gain by becoming a member. However, recall that a low value
of our first measure of unionisation can arise because workers do not choose
to become a member of a recognised union, or because there are no recognised
unions in an occupation-industry cell. The second measure of union organisa-
tion is low only if workers do not choose to become a member. The estimated
wage premia are in the second column of Table 9. For the second measure, we
note a recognition premium of 4.3% and 3.7% (significant at 10%) for low and
medium unionisation environments, respectively. This supports the hypothesis
that important recognition effects on wages exists. Moreover, in high unionisa-
tion environments we estimate a membership premium of 4.7%, although not
very precise (significant at 10%). This suggests that only in environments with
a recognised union and a large fraction of union members among workers, a
membership premium can be earned. In environments with a recognised union,
and an intermediate or low fraction of members among the workers, the work-
ers seem to earn a recognition premium rather than a membership premium.
This recognition premium is estimated around 4%. Before, we also obtained a
recognition premium of this size, but we did not distinguish between different
degrees of unionisation (see Table 5). Finally, the third measure of unionisation
indicates a low level of unionisation if a small fraction of workers works in a
workplace with a recognised union. The third column of Table 9 shows signifi-
cant recognition premia of 5.6% and 4.3% (significant at 10%) for environments
with low and medium degree of unionisation, respectively. We do not obtain
significant estimates of the membership premia, which stresses the importance
of recognition rather than membership in obtaining a union wage premium.
We would like to discuss two important issues related to union wage differ-
entials within the context of our estimates. The first issue is that of free-riding
behaviour by non-members. Non-members could be free-riders if they benefit
from what is provided by the union without paying union dues. How do our
estimates relate to the free-rider hypothesis ? The estimates in the second col-
umn of Table 9 suggest that there is a membership premium in environments
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with a high fraction of union members among the workers, while workers earn
a recognition premium in environments with a low or intermediate degree of
unionisation. This suggests that in environments where the majority is not a
member, only a recognition premium can be earned. Similarly, the estimates
suggest that only in environments where the majority is a member of the recog-
nised union, a membership premium can be earned. Hence, our results do not
suggest that union power is eroded by a large amount of free-riders. Booth and
Bryan (2001) use employer-employee data from the 1998 Workplace Employee
Relations Survey, which allows to test for free-rider hypothesis directly. They do
not find wage differences between members and non-members who are covered
by a wage agreement. In their analysis, they control for unobserved workplace
heterogeneity, whereas we control for unobserved worker heterogeneity.21
The second issue is whether the recognition premium is not simply a com-
pensating wage differentials for non-members. We think this is not a correct
interpretation of our results. While members are likely to receive non-pecuniary
benefits to which non-members are not entitled, the recognition premium is not
a compensating wage differential, since it measures the wage premium in com-
parison to non-members in a workplace without a recognised union. In addition,
if the recognition premium is a compensating wage differential, we would expect
to see significant recognition premia in high unionisation environments, because
non-union workers are more likely to demand compensation in workplaces with
a strong rather than a weak union presence.
In sum, our empirical evidence points to recognition being the main driving
factor for a wage premium rather than individual membership. In addition to
the paper by Booth and Bryan (2001), our results also find support by survey
evidence in Millward et al. (2000). They report that in 1998 about 70% of
all workers in recognised workplaces were covered by collective bargaining.22 If
21Another important difference with their analysis is that in our sample, workers in work-
places without a recognised union are present. This allows us to investigate whether there
is still a union wage premium given that there are no differences between members and non-
members within workplaces with a recognised union.
22Our sample spans the period 1995-1997. Disney, Gosling and Machin (1996) argue that
the recognition decision is a long term decision made near the start-up data of an establish-
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this figure relates also to collective wage bargaining, it suggests membership
is mainly for other reasons than wages. Other supporting evidence is Hildreth
(2000) who did not find differences between members and non-members in sat-
isfaction with their wage.
ment. Recognition can therefore be considered a persistent phenomenon hence justifying a
comparison with the figures of Millward et al. (1998)
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6 Conclusion
Recent evidence suggests that during the nineties no wage differences existed in
Great Britain between members and non-members within recognised workplaces
(Booth and Bryan (2001), Millward et al. (2000), Hildreth (2000)). This paper
presents panel data estimates of union wage differentials for Great Britain for the
period 1995-1997. Our results support the hypothesis that the wage premium
members receive above non-union workers is due to recognition, rather than
individual membership. As such, we provide evidence that the recent findings
are also true in case one corrects for unobserved worker heterogeneity. Moreover,
our estimates indicate that the recognition premium is about 4% in size.
Our analysis also suggests that if the majority of workers are member of
the recognised union, there is a membership premium to earn in addition to
the recognition premium. We have argued that our results are not likely to
reflect compensating wage differentials for non-members, nor do they suggest
that union power is eroded by free-riding behaviour among non-members in
workplaces with a recognised union.
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Appendix
Table 1: Distribution over union categories
1995 1996 1997 All
recognised
member
734 (0.378) 868 (0.369) 760 (0.382) 2362 (0.376)
recognised
non-member
320 (0.165) 416 (0.176) 328 (0.165) 1064 (0.169)
not recognised
non-member
852 (0.438) 1028 (0.437) 863 (0.433) 2743 (0.436)
not recognised
member
37 (0.019) 43 (0.018) 41 (0.020) 121 (0.019)
Total 1943 2355 1992 6290
Note: percentages are given in brackets.
Table 2: Unconditional Wage Differentials
1995 1996 1997 All
recognised
member
0.227 (0.026) 0.234 (0.024) 0.224 (0.027) 0.229 (0.015)
recognised
non-member
0.083 (0.035) 0.095 (0.031) 0.096 (0.034) 0.091 (0.019)
not recognised
member
0.238 (0.133) 0.390 (0.102) 0.296 (0.094) 0.312 (0.063)
Total 1943 2355 1992 6290
Note: The figures are differences in log real hourly wages with respect the wage of
non-members in workplaces without a recognised union. Standard errors are given in
brackets.
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Table 3: Occupational distribution by union category
recognised
member
recognised
non-member
managers and administrators 0.098 0.137
professional occupations 0.170 0.120
associate professional or technical 0.136 0.128
clerical/secretarial 0.164 0.249
craft 0.101 0.070
personal/protective services 0.120 0.131
sales 0.028 0.043
plant/machine operatives 0.108 0.058
other 0.075 0.065
Total 2362 1064
not recognised
member
not recognised
non-member
managers and administrators 0.165 0.207
professional occupations 0.256 0.079
associate professional or technical 0.182 0.088
clerical/secretarial 0.033 0.197
craft 0.116 0.108
personal/protective services 0.025 0.083
sales 0.025 0.100
plant/machine operatives 0.165 0.080
other 0.033 0.059
Total 121 2743
Note: Jobs are classified according to the 1-digit Standard Occupational Classicication
(SOC).
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics
Variable mean Variable mean
log wage (hourly) 1.919 (0.548) other manufacturing industries 0.093
recognised member 0.375 construction 0.023
recognised nonmember 0.169 distribution, hotels, catering 0.163
nonrecognised member 0.019 transport and communication 0.063
nonunion worker 0.436 banking, finance, insurance
female 0.516 business services and leasing 0.133
fulltime 0.758 other services 0.361
hhh 0.529 Inner London 0.030
age 39.990 (10.54) Outer London 0.068
married 0.780 Region of South East 0.204
health 0.035 South West 0.091
age at completion education 18.162 (4.465) East Anglia 0.042
noqualif 0.141 East Midlands 0.077
manual 0.283 West Midlands Conurb 0.027
public 0.318 Region of West Midlands 0.060
training 0.400 Greater Manchester 0.035
tenure 5.560 (5.856) Merseyside 0.020
managers and administrators 0.154 Region of North West 0.041
professional occupations 0.123 South Yorkshire 0.029
associate professional or West Yorkshire 0.030
technical 0.114 Region of Yorks and Huvber 0.036
clerical/secretarial 0.190 Tyne and Wear 0.021
craft 0.100 Region of North 0.051
personal/protective services 0.104 Wales 0.054
sales 0.061 Scotland 0.084
plant/machine operatives 0.088 firm size (-25) 0.317
other 0.066 firm size (25-99) 0.258
agriculture,forestry firm size (100-499) 0.247
and fishing 0.011 firm size (≤ 500) 0.178
energy and water supplies 0.021
chemical 0.032
metal goods, engineering
and vechicles industries 0.098
observations 6290
Notes
1) standard deviations are given in brackets for non-dummy variables.
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Table 5: Union status estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS WG SYS SYS
rit
0.041∗
(0.019)
rituit (γ1)
0.123∗
(0.019)
0.019
(0.025)
0.042∗∗
(0.023)
-
rit(1− uit) (γ2) 0.035
∗∗
(0.020)
0.017
(0.019)
0.033∗∗
(0.019)
-
uit(1− rit) (γ3) 0.062(0.055)
−0.054
(0.054)
−0.031
(0.038)
−0.031
(0.038)
Sargan test 136.3 (117) 130.9 (113)
Correlation test 34.9 (32) 32.0 (32)
NT 6290 3935 6290 6290
i) The dependent variable is log deflated hourly real wages. Heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation robust standard errors are given in parenthesis. Asterisks
denote significance levels of 5 % (*) or 10 % (**).
ii) Pooled OLS results are in column (1). Column (2) shows the within group
estimator results. Columns (3) and (4)show results for the system estimator.
iii) Instruments used for the system in differenced equations are current values
of full-time, head of household, married, eduage, noqualif, public, training,
occupational dummies (8), sectoral dummies (9) and regional dummies (17).
All current and lagged values are included for recognised members and non-
members, non-recognised member, age, health, manual, firm size dummies (3)
and tenure (2).
iv) The instruments used for the level equation are female and the time-means
of head of household, age, married, health, sectoral dummies (9), tenure (2)
and regional dummies (17).
v) The correlation test tests for correlation of the instruments used for the
level equation and the unobserved time-invariant effect. This is a Hausman
type Wald test as described in Arellano (1993).
Table 6: Descriptives union organisation measures
Measure Mean St. dev. quantile 1 quantile 2 quantile 3
O1 1995 0.336 0.217 (0, 0.20) (0.20, 0.40) (0.40, 1)
1996 0.336 0.212 (0, 0.17) (0.20, 0.41) (0.41, 1)
1997 0.320 0.211 (0, 0.20) (0.20, 0.40) (0.40, 1)
O2 1995 0.604 0.191 (0, 0.56) (0.56, 0.69) (0.69, 1)
1996 0.612 0.168 (0, 0.53) (0.53, 0.69) (0.69, 1)
1997 0.584 0.197 (0, 0.55) (0.53, 0.65) (0.65, 1)
O3 1995 0.509 0.253 (0, 0.34) (0.34, 0.61) (0.61, 1)
1996 0.512 0.248 (0, 0.36) (0.36, 0.65) (0.65, 1)
1997 0.500 0.245 (0, 0.34) (0.34, 0.63) (0.63, 1)
Measures of union organisation are defined in text.
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Table 7: Distribution union categories - unionisation classes
recognised recognised non-recognised non-recognised
member non-member member non-member Total
O1
low 0.039 0.038 0.006 0.234 0.317
medium 0.129 0.068 0.003 0.146 0.346
high 0.208 0.063 0.010 0.056 0.337
O2
low 0.055 0.058 0.005 0.198 0.316
medium 0.124 0.063 0.005 0.147 0.339
high 0.196 0.048 0.010 0.084 0.338
O3
low 0.041 0.034 0.006 0.236 0.317
medium 0.135 0.066 0.004 0.153 0.358
high 0.199 0.069 0.009 0.048 0.325
i) Measures of union organisation are defined in text.
ii) Numbers are percentages over whole sample of 6290 observations.
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Table 8: System estimates - degree of unionisation
O1 O2 O3
(1) (2) (3)
SYS SYS SYS
not recognised
non-member
medium (δ02)
−0.026
(0.020)
−0.019
(0.014)
−0.016
(0.019)
high (δ03)
−0.040
(0.027)
−0.005
(0.018)
−0.014
(0.036)
recognised
member
low (δ11)
0.010
(0.027)
0.038
(0.024)
0.034
(0.027)
medium (δ12)
0.027
(0.028)
0.027
(0.025)
0.026
(0.029)
high (δ13)
0.018
(0.029)
0.032
(0.028)
0.030
(0.034)
recognised
non-member
low (δ21)
0.053∗
(0.022)
0.043∗
(0.021)
0.056∗
(0.023)
medium (δ22)
0.003
(0.026)
0.018
(0.021)
0.027
(0.026)
high (δ23)
−0.005
(0.130)
−0.015
(0.030)
−0.004
(0.035)
not recognised
member
−0.057
(0.038)
−0.031
(0.037)
−0.041
(0.039)
Sargan test 169.2(141) 164.7(141) 168.8(141)
Correlation test 44.6(32) 43.2(32) 41.9(32)
NT 6290 6290 6290
i) Measures of union organisation are defined in text.
ii) See notes i), iii)-v) in Table 7.
iii) In addition, all current and lagged values of the union variables
are used as instruments for the system of differenced equations.
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Table 9: Union wage premia - degree of unionisation
O1 O2 O3
membership premium
low
−0.043∗∗
(0.025)
−0.005
(0.021)
−0.022
(0.025)
medium
0.024
(0.021)
0.009
(0.020)
−0.001
(0.022)
high
0.023
(0.024)
0.047∗∗
(0.027)
0.034
(0.027)
recognition premium
low
0.053∗
(0.022)
0.043∗
(0.021)
0.056∗
(0.023)
medium
0.029
(0.022)
0.037∗∗
(0.020)
0.043∗∗
(0.023)
high
0.035
(0.028)
−0.010
(0.029)
0.010
(0.034)
i) Measures of union organisation are defined in text.
ii) The union wage premia are based on estimates in Table 8.
iii) Low, medium, and high refer to the degree of unionisation in the
work environment.
iv) Standard errors are in brackets.
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